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Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Nationalism remains important issue in East Asian countries and seems to 
become increasingly irresistible force these days as the result of a series of serious 
challenges regarding to national interest and regional security. Due to their special 
cultural, historical and geopolitical circumstances, the relations and rivalries among 
East Asian countries appear more complicated and risky, which make a few dangerous 
uncertainties to Asian-Pacific peace and order. The bilateral relationships between 
China and Japan, Japan and South Korea, have become increasingly strained due to a 
variety of disagreements over key political issues, such as territorial claims. (Kimura, 
2014) One of those most intractable should be the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute as 
well as the increasing levels of naval and aerial engagements over this issue between 
China and Japan. Although the claims of these islands do concern practical interests of 
both countries, great symbolic value has been invested in the incident, whose process 
and fallout is frequently interpreted as evidence of an ongoing “power shift” in East 
Asia or explained as a consequence of such a “power shift”. In such narrative, 
Chinese “aggressiveness” or “pressure”, and Japanese “weakness” or “defeat” are 
understood respectively as reflections of “China’s rise” and “Japan’s decline”. 
(Hagstrom, 2012) This means the rivalry over territorial dispute, far beyond its own 
practical meaning, appears more sensitive and irreconcilable to both of them, which 
also largely explains Japan’s deep-seated doubt about China’s real intentions. (Shu, 
2010) This hot spot, along with ever-present unsettled “history problems” and 
complex emotions towards China’s newly rise, leads to the exacerbating popular 
images, increasing distrust, antipathy of each other and the upsurges of nationalist 
sentiments on both sides. (Cho & Park, 2011)  
 
Apart from stimuli like the current conflicts involving specific and practical 
benefits, nationalist sentiments, to a large extent, originate from the memories and 
“inherent” oppositional sentiments in East Asia, which mainly stems from 
periodically contested quarrels about this region’s painful past and historical 
animosity. “History problems” refers to a series of controversial issues on modern 
invasion, occupation and colonization, Japanese wartime atrocities, history textbooks 
that justify and glorify Japanese colonial rule and Japanese leaders’ homage to 
Yasukuni Shrine (where convicted Japanese war criminals in World War II are 
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enshrined), etc., which could be seen in many ways as the most important source that 
provides nationalist flames with fuel in China and Korea. (Cumings, 2007) This has 
been, and continues to be, one of the defining features of East Asian international 
relations, with largely negative regional consequences for alliance ties and regional 
institution-building. (Cho & Park, 2011) Such features appear much typical especially 
between China and Japan. Wang Zheng introduced the term Bainian Guochi (a 
century of national humiliation) which refers to the period from the outbreak of the 
First Opium War in 1839 until the end of World War II in 1945, when China was 
attacked, bullied, looted and torn asunder by imperialists in a whole century. He also 
argues, for many Chinese people, they have not really moved forward from their past 
humiliation and the assumption that “time heals all wounds” taken granted by many 
of those from the countries of China’s “ex-colonial aggressors”, unfortunately, is 
wrong. Chinese historical consciousness of the so-called Bainian Guochi still plays a 
powerful role affecting Chinese politics, foreign relations and national psyche. (Wang, 
2008) Among all those “invaders” and their “evil deeds”, excluding propaganda out of 
ideological tensions in the Cold War, such real and horrible incidents as Nanking 
Massacre and the cession of Taiwan, particularly nailed their perpetrator Japan to 
“unforgivable” pillory in many people’s mind. The controversial claims of 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands can actually be regarded, for some aspects, as parts of the 
continued ramifications of former historical legacies as well, since China argues that 
Diaoyu Islands, as the affiliated islands of Taiwan, has long been the territory and 
under control of China since Ming Dynasty in 1372 based on the earliest records, and 
taken by Japan secretly by force in late Qing Dynasty when China was weak. (Xinhua, 
2012-09-25) This kind of historical consciousness, in Wang’s opinion, is usually 
strengthened rather than assuaged by China’s recent economic success and growing 
muscles, and serves to activate the patriotism and nationalism, which is why it’s 
necessary to avoid merely viewing China through its present and important to 
understand one of the main origins of Chinese nationalism, in his words, to view 
China “through a more comprehensive lens which takes national identity and 
domestic discourse into account.” (Wang, 2008) 
 
One thing to stress here is that people’s memories and emotions involving 
nationalism is definitely not limited to modern history – Chinese nationalism is 
destined to be not a simple concept due to China’s long and unique civilization. Peter 
Hays Gries (2005; 2004) explored three periods of “past” in Chinese history and 
argued that “5000 years”, “100 years” and “10 years”, which respectively refers to 
“the heavy burden of five-thousand-year civilization”, “a century of humiliation” and 
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“ten years in Mao’s era”, are such three periods of history that had remarkable effect 
in the formation of today’s Chinese nationalism. His research could well help us to 
understand what “Chinese” means in this century and how people and their passion 
work in contemporary Chinese nationalism. 
 
However, history is not the only source of oppositional sentiments and 
nationalism; Japan is neither the only target nor concern. There are plenty of 
researches studying the social and economic origins, the evolving process of Chinese 
nationalism as well as the connections and interactions of different factors in this 
process. (Zhao, 2013; Li & Lin, 2012; Tang & Darr, 2012) In these papers, the roles 
of authoritarian regime, market economy, civil society, media, Internet and new 
technologies, etc. in the changing process of Chinese nationalism are studied and 
elaborated. It could be observed that some social conditions and voices fuel or take 
part in the nationalism in ways which sometimes add quite different qualities and 
claims to it as well. Yang (2013) and Wu (2007) focused on citizen activism online 
and cyber nationalism respectively, and in both of their researches, it could be easily 
found that Chinese nationalism, at least partly shown by those online nationalists, has 
a tendency of mixing or collaborating with other radical thoughts like populism and 
political conservatism (usually Maoist leftism in Chinese context), etc. This kind of 
characteristics is backed up by other research focusing on the revival of Chinese 
leftism online. (Hu, 2007) Hu argues, “because of the growing prevalence and 
intensity of online debates regarding the nature of Chinese reform, itself initiated as a 
nationalistic mission, what we are witnessing at present is not only the apparent tide 
of state-guided Chinese nationalism, but more importantly the revival of Chinese 
leftism on- and offline as both a less cherished but firm undercurrent and a persistent 
challenge to that tide.” 
 
Many scholars also pointed out that domestic politics regarding leaders’ personal 
bias and intentions could lead to state authorities’ playing on such popular feelings for 
the sake of political needs. (Kimura, 2014; Tang & Darr, 2012; Cho & Park, 2011) In 
China’s case, Chinese Communist Party was able to defeat Kuomintang (KMT) and 
take over China in 1949 largely due to its ability to appeal to the sentiment of public 
nationalism. Although in the previous years of communist rule, “Marxist ideology 
went side by side with nationalism”, Tang and Darr argue, “Marxism has been 
replaced by economic pragmatism since late 1970s and nationalism has served almost 
exclusively as the ideological instrument for political mobilization”, which was 
especially true after 1989 Tiananmen Incident and following crackdowns when CCP 
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launched a nationwide campaign to promote “patriotic education”, nationalism and 
anti-Western sentiment to restore its legitimacy. (Tang & Darr, 2012) After this in the 
last two decades, the coming nationalist protests have mainly aimed at events most of 
which concern China’s relations with the US and Japan, however, Chinese 
government’s role in these protests also became more subtle and vague, who 
seemingly tended to keep some sort of balance and at times vacillated between 
support and repress, possibly due to China’s increasing participation in the global 
affairs and much closer economic ties with those countries. China now is Japan’s 
biggest trade partner while Japan is one of China’s most important origins of 
technologies and foreign investment, which means great dependence on each other. 
(Wang, 2010) Nationalism is a double-edged sword serving not only as the origin of 
legitimacy, but in some cases the chance and platform for different social and even 
political forces with “ulterior motives”. When China’s no longer isolated world full of 
radical ideologies and nationalism’s no longer easily controlled, it needs to take into 
account much more than risk playing fire, which is likely to damage not only the trade 
relations but also its own stability. (Kang, 2013) 
 
On Japanese side, a good illustration of political figures’ taking advantage of 
popular feelings would be the nationalization of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012, 
which was initially instigated by the Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, and 
eventually resulted in the recent wave of heightened tensions between China and 
Japan lasting until now. Horiuchi (2014) examined the role of public opinion in Japan 
in directly influencing the Japanese government’s decision to nationalize the Senkaku 
Islands in 2012. He argued that the nationalization took place within a nationalistic 
domestic environment while in the process the “public opinion was channeled most 
notably through Tokyo Governor Ishihara”, whose plan to purchase the Islands and 
popular support for his plan “eventually forced the central government’s intervention” 
and left Prime Minister Noda no choice but to nationalize the Islands. Nevertheless, 
no matter what kind of predicament Noda was in, Japanese government’s actions 
would neither be understood nor disregarded by China since Chinese leaders also 
have their own concerns to calculate. Takeuchi argues that domestic politics on both 
sides of the dispute result in uncertainty regarding leaders’ intentions, which drives 
the initiation and escalation of an unnecessary dispute. (Kimura, 2014)  
Anyway, Japan’s move provoked swift and violent reactions from both Chinese 
government and the public – a series of counter measures in waters near the islands 
and two-month nationwide, large-scale anti-Japanese protests in over 100 cities. 
(Island, 2012; Wikipedia, 2012 China anti-Japanese demonstrations; International 
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Business Times, Sep. 17 2012) The fallout from these incidents still contributes to the 
deadlock and constant frictions between China and Japan until now. 
 
 Although the Islands Dispute seemed to be the key issue and direct blasting 
fuse igniting the enmities and tensions between two countries, the factors involved, 
ranging from nationalist sentiments on both sides to security and economic concerns 
about the present and the future, are indeed complicated and tangled. When we return 
to the case of China and its nationalism, the sources and researches mentioned above, 
on the other hand, revealed the many facets and the complexity of Chinese 
nationalism – its possible origins, causes and components. Since Fairclough argues 
that “discourse is the tool of ideology”, then in what way have these many facets, has 
this kind of complexity been shown by its discourse? There are plenty of researches 
studying the discourse of Chinese nationalism on different levels, especially the 
official discourse of CCP and Chinese government, nationalistic scholars and their 
works, as well as nationalism in the media and cyberspace. (Zheng, 2012; Li & Lin, 
2012; Stockmann, 2010; Breslin & Shen 2010; Chen, 2006) But what is the 
nationalist discourse like on the mass movement level, or in this specific case of 
anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2012? Is it possible that the many facets of Chinese 
nationalism also backed up by something on the ground level, by the discourse down 
to individuals while still relating to aspects we have discussed above? What, and for 
what possible reasons, might people holding banners and fervently participating in 
these protests try to express? 
Scholars like Yang (2013) pointed out the possible linkage between online 
nationalist debates, discourse of activism and protests on the street – the linkage of 
both the people performing these deeds and the main concerns/ways of expression 
they have, on- and offline. However, except for news reports and pictures, not many 
researches directly focused on the people themselves in such anti-Japanese protests as 
well as the banners and slogans they used, which may quite possibly be a good way to 
study their discourse and ideas. For one thing, language used by anti-Japanese 
demonstrators is obviously an inseparable part of the discourse system of 
contemporary Chinese nationalists, though their concerns may not be limited to Japan. 
The language they used takes their roots in the history and changing process of 
Chinese nationalism and society, just as introduced by the literature. For another, 2012 
protests broke out in over 100 Chinese cities in two months, which even unusually 
spread into middle-sized cities and small towns, and were said to be the largest scale 
since the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972. (BBC, Sep.15 
2012) This means the degree of such sentiments being popular and in some ways their 
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claims being representative, at least within the groups launching these protests; and a 
good diversity of samples in different areas could be provided and studied. Since 
textual banners and slogans are almost condensed key words and prior messages of 
people’s concerns, intentions, i.e. to a great extent, why they were there demonstrating 
and shouting their claims, moreover, they were created with certain motives and 
designed into certain forms, it is possible that we can unlock more secrets from these 
textual materials with proper methods and obtain a larger picture these texts as well as 
the nationalist discourse fit into.  
 
The main ideas of this research hence become clear – Chinese nationalism and 
specific situations like the islands dispute as the background, slogans from the 
protests as research objects, and mainly involved critical discourse analysis as the 
methods – altogether, to link the pieces of specific texts in the slogans back to some 
parts of the jigsaw puzzle of nationalist discourse. This thesis aims to explore the 
complexity of Chinese nationalist discourse on the popular movement level with a 
case study of the slogans in 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations, to prove the 
coherence between the discourse discussed here in this paper and some other 
researches on Chinese nationalism. The main title of this thesis is “What did they say 
and why did they say so”, however, in the process of answering these two questions, it 
likely means that the more various content or ideas we observe through the slogans, 
the more loose and fragmented the discourse system, and hence the group of people 
using such discourse and holding such opinions, may turn out to be. Beyond these two 
simple but crucial questions, this research attempts to test and verify one hypothesis 
that, nationalism is a large flag under which people seemingly originally gather, or be 
gathered, to demonstrate their solidarity and uniformity while eventually ironically 
exposed their serious division and divergence. 
  
 9 / 60 
 
1.2. Background 
To view the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012, three points relating to the 
background are especially important to mention and emphasize again here: China’s 
domestic politics, Sino-Japanese economic relations and the islands dispute. 
1.2.1 Domestic Politics 
The 2012 was the year of China’s political leadership transition, which means 
that new top leaders of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), of whom the coming future 
of China might lie in the hands, would come out and take over the power to rule the 
country with the world’s largest population and second largest economy in the next 
five years. (The Diplomat, Nov. 16 2012) China is definitely not a democracy with 
free general elections of their top leaders according to Western standards of any kind 
and hence the nontransparent process remained highly mysterious and vigilant, 
attracting tons of interest and speculation from both ordinary Chinese and foreign 
media. The transfer of power and new leaders might bring new changes to China but 
in the meantime it first of all implies that the year of 2012’s meant to be crucial and 
highly sensitive, and therefore Wei Wen – “preserving stability” (Feng, 2013) would 
be the supreme concern and first priority of Chinese government, which usually 
means fortified security measures across China, stricter restrictions on dissidents and 
online censorship, and even lower chance to tolerate massive social protests, unless in 
some cases and for some reasons there may be other special need to divert public 
attention by means of nationalist sentiments towards foreign countries, just as argued 
by some scholars. (Tang & Darr, 2012) One possibility of this kind could be the 
occurrence of unusual domestic political incident that is thought to likely jeopardize 
the “social stability” or the necessarily “smooth and steady” process of expected 
power change. 
How those leaders had been anointed and come into office remained unknown to 
most “outsiders” due to lack of open and credible information, but one thing for sure 
is that, the whole process was far from “smooth and peaceful” as it seemed to be and 
the final result was merely the outcome of rivalry and compromise, of a series of 
“hard bargain” games among powerful interest groups and factions within CCP. 
Different leaders within CCP Politburo Standing Committee, “the party's top 
decision-making body”, are generally viewed as the mouthpiece or representative of 
different factions/groups by critics and scholars. (CNN, After months of mystery, 
China unveils new top leaders. Nov. 16 2012) More importantly, this is where 
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different leaders and factions holding/on behalf of different political opinions, 
especially those on China’s reforms and development, and people/social forces 
supporting respective political opinions are linked together.  
Although the factions could be many based on different criteria or focuses (like 
the birth-oriented Princeling, etc.), the attitude towards China’s reforms and opinion 
about the future road that China should take is one of the most important standards to 
distinguish different factions within CCP and Chinese government. For example, 
leaders inclined to support continuous market-oriented economic reforms (similar to 
Deng Xiaoping’s political thoughts), stronger actions to fight corruption or more open 
attitude to public concerns can be labeled as reformists; on the contrary, officials 
denying universal values, opposing “radical” reforms like the declaration of family 
property of civil servants or in favor of preserving absolute party authority and 
coercive measures in dealing with mass incidents, etc. are quite possibly regarded as 
the conservative. By this standard, in Chinese political context, officials and groups 
could be roughly divided into two main factions – the Conservative (left), who 
highlight “preserving stability” “strengthening socialist roots” over anything else, 
willing/tend to maintain the status quo or even return to China’s past road in Mao’s 
era (Mao’s pictures, thoughts and quotations are frequently used by those pro-Mao 
cadres); and the Reformist (right), who emphasize continuous and effective reforms of 
China’s economy and politics at present and in the future, to let more people more 
equally share the benefits of development, basically along Deng Xiaoping’s road (who 
initiated China’s Open and Reform Era three decades ago and finally led to rapid 
change and development). (Center for American Progress, China’s Forthcoming 
Political Transition – China’s left/right ideological divides. Feb.9 2012) However, the 
division and fight among factions seem never limited to the party itself. And for those 
who radically and fervently support and debate these political ideas in the cyberspace, 
Zhao Jing (2013) put all of them under the tag of nationalists while dividing them into 
“left cynics” (左愤) and “right cynics” (右愤) (two deriving from the same word 
Fenqing, literally meaning angry young men, young nationalists or cynics) according 
to their arguments, since they all show great concern and seemingly uncontrollable 
strong “sense of responsibility” about China’s fate and development despite their 
irreconcilable divergence of opinions. 
 
Both Willy Lam (2012) and Hu (2007) explored the revival of Maoism or new 
leftism in China as major factions of the CCP take a conservative turn in ideology and 
politics. They respectively studied the impact of the restoration of Maoist norms and 
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thoughts on aspects of Chinese politics and the people’s online debates. Lam also 
assessed the Chongqing campaign spearheaded by the ousted party chief of 
Chongqing, Bo Xilai, who is well-known for his political practices, generally seen as 
direct challenges to central government in the charge of President Hu Jintao and 
Premier Wen Jiabao – two famous grassroots-background reformist leaders, and his 
dramatic downfall in March of 2012 due to the direct impact of Wang Lijun Incident 
(Wikipedia – Wang Lijun Incident), both in and outside of China. Bo Xilai, the highly 
controversial and famous local chief leader with Princeling background, great power, 
influence and political ambitions, who had initiated a so-called Chongqing Model in 
the name of Mao Zedong thoughts, under which “revolutionary traditions, socialist 
culture, social equality and justice” were exceptionally stressed, launched a series of 
“changhong dahei” (唱红打黑) – campaigns of “singing red (revolutionary) songs 
and striking the black (gangsters)” in Chongqing City in the years under his rule, was 
once viewed as the most significant figure in the eyes of Maoist leftists and powerful 
candidate for potential Politburo Standing Committee Member on the CCP’s 18th 
National Congress at the end of 2012. His rise and fall (BBC, Bo Xilai scandal: 
Timeline. Nov.11 2013) contributed to one of the most important variables when we 
are to view Chinese leadership transition itself, domestic political/social environment 
of that year and hence the 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations, since Bo’s dismission 
was out of question a hard blow to leftists and people/forces still in favor of him, 
some of whom were very likely to express their grievances provided there were any 
possible chances. 
 
1.2.2 Sino-Japanese Economic Relations 
Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, these two countries have 
indeed achieved a wide range of communication and cooperation in many fields. One 
of the most remarkable fruit of the ameliorative relations is the rapidly-developed and 
increasingly close economic ties between China and Japan, further strengthened and 
accelerated by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Due to China’s continuous 
economic reforms, cheap labor, broad market and two countries’ complementary 
industrial structure, such ties have been improving despite their constant political and 
diplomatic discords. (Wang, 2010)  
Since 2007, China has taken the place of the United States as Japan’s largest 
trade partner and their bilateral trade reached 266.79 billion US dollars in 2008. In 
2009, China also became Japan’s biggest exporting market, even though there was a 
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24% decline in bilateral trade due to the impact of international financial crisis. 
Japan’s direct investments in China began in 1979, but by the end of 2008, the 
cumulative number of Japan’s investment programs in China had already reached 
41,162 with an actual capital amount of 65.38 billion US dollars. Most of those 
programs and Japanese companies in China, based on statistics, have achieved great 
success and generous returns, which strongly supported the growth and resurgence of 
Japanese economy and China’s development as well. (Zhang, 2009) Japanese 
products, especially electronic devices like cameras, cell-phones, etc. and automobiles, 
are very popular among people with middle/lower incomes due to their fair quality 
and comparatively cheap price. Japanese automobile brands held over 20% market 
shares (once 30% in best periods) in China before the Islands Dispute in 2012. (China 
Finance, 2014-04-04; Huanqiu Finance, 2012-12-06)  
 
Ironically, apart from the intense economic interactions, not all other aspects of 
Sino-Japanese relations move forward equally due to a series of disagreements over 
key issues. The fact of high economic dependence on each other incurs discussions 
every time the diplomatic relations between two countries got into trouble, which is 
often summarized as “政冷经热” – “cold politics and hot economy”, which refers to 
that China and Japan have already become economically highly dependent on each 
other while this has not much affected their cold political relations, and reversely, the 
several setbacks and even crises in their political relations also seemingly did not 
much “disturb” economic interactions. (Liu, 2007) Some scholars attribute this 
situation largely to the so-called complementary or interdependent industrial structure 
of China and Japan, which refers to the mainly labor, resource intensive industrial 
structure on China’s side and high technology, capital intensive industrial structure on 
Japan’s side. (Gao & Zhao, 2012; Wang, 2010)  
Their arguments do make sense, however, the diplomatic crisis and anti-Japanese 
demonstrations caused by the Islands Dispute in 2012 seemingly put more serious 
threat on this situation and revealed some change. (China Daily, 2012-10-20) It could 
be observed the prevailing claims to boycott Japanese products and suggestion to 
suspend travel plans to Japan across China during that period, from both spontaneous 
individual actions and official sanctions. The frequent violence against Japanese cars 
and shops in China also led Japanese companies to serious losses and a harsh winter. 
For example, directly impacted Japanese automobile companies’ market share 
dropped to merely 8%. (Huanqiu Finance, 2012-12-06) Due to the aftermaths of those 
incidents, the bilateral trade in 2013 remained negative growth that the growth rate of 
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the total amount of bilateral imports and exports of the first and second quarter of the 
year was respectively -10.7% and -9.3%. (Zhang, 2014) Many scholars then think that 
the current Sino-Japanese relations are no longer “cold politics and hot economy” but 
fell into “cold politics and cool economy”, that is to say, a significant turn of the 
interdependent and balanced economic and trade relations between China and Japan. 
China’s state newspaper, People’s Daily also presented an article in favor of such 
opinion. (People, 2013-11-21)  
Zhang (2014) questions such argument and argues that such ‘cooling down’ 
would not last long as usual and the recovery of Japanese cars in China market, for 
example, can already be seen. (China Daily, 2014-01-09) Since China is still 
dependent on Japanese technologies and funds, Japanese brands still have their 
advantages among Chinese consumers, though “bravado” kind of voices to boycott do 
exist and take effect temporarily, there is large space to cooperate with Japan; in spite 
of the political deadlock, the bilateral economic relations are very important and on 
the way to better development. The title of a critique may also tell the same simple 
but crucial truth that “China and Japan may not like each other, but they need each 
other.” (Time, Dec. 01, 2013) 
 
1.2.3 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute 
Diaoyu Islands, known as Senkaku Islands in Japanese, are a group of eight 
uninhabited islets and rocks with an area of approximately 7 square kilometers in the 
East China Sea, of which the largest has an area of 4.32 km
2 
and the smallest is only 
0.45 km
2
. In spite of the not large area, the geopolitical context surrounding the 
islands is highly complicated, since the islands are roughly equidistant to the north of 
Taiwan, southwestern tip of Okinawa of Japan and the east of Mainland China. More 
importantly, besides the strategic location, the potential huge amounts of oil, natural 
gas and other resources in the waters nearby are of great concern to countries with 
high energy demands like China and Japan, therefore the islands appear extremely 
important to both of them. (Albrecht & Chemier, 2014) 
Both China and Japan claim those islands as their territory on different basses. 
Japan bases its sovereignty claims on the fact that it incorporated the islands as terra 
nullius – “vacant territory” on January 14th, 1895 and has been continuously 
occupying the islands since then. That is to say, due to the incorporation as “vacant 
territory” and long-time “unchallenged” effective control (Japanese government 
argues that China claimed the islands only in 1971), Japan seems to have a strong 
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claim to the sovereignty in terms of contemporary rules of international law. (Drifte, 
2013) 
In sharp contrast to Japan’ argument, however, China uses a history-based 
approach to support its claim and refutes the so-called “vacant territory” explanation 
held by Japan. According to the official white book of China’s State Council (Xinhua, 
2012-09-25), Chinese ancestors were the earliest people that discovered, named and 
utilized the islands based on the historical records, which could date back to 1372 in 
China’s Ming Dynasty, and since then China has exercised effective control over 
those islands. The historical documents of Ryukyu Kingdom and maps of east China 
coasts made by French geologists in 1809, by the UK in 1811, by the US scholars in 
1859 and British Navy in 1877 all listed Diaoyu Islands under the control of Chinese 
Qing Empire and therefore refute Japan’s claim of incorporating Senkaku Islands as 
“vacant territory”. China accuses that Japan speeded up the overseas aggression and 
expansion after its Meiji Restoration and plotted to occupy Diaoyu Islands after it had 
annexed Ryukyu Kingdom and renamed as Okinawa in 1879; and later on, Japan 
seized the chance of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 when China was weak 
and defeated, and finally succeeded in secretly incorporating the islands by means of 
the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki to cede China’s Taiwan and its affiliated islands to 
Japan. That is to say, after the World War II, with the abolishment of all former 
unequal treaties, Japan must give up all its illegally occupied territories during the war 
and Diaoyu Islands should have returned to China along with Taiwan. Moreover, 
China also censures the US for arbitrarily bringing Diaoyu Islands into its jurisdiction 
after war in 1950s and illegally “returning the jurisdiction” to Japan without China’s 
permission in 1970s – “the underhand secret dealings during Cold War”. 
 
Many scholars pointed out that due to the special historical circumstances, the 
controversy over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands largely take its roots in the last upheaval of 
East Asian order when the traditional China-oriented system was broken due to 
western challenges and the rise of Japan and therefore these islands bear such 
complex memories relating to power shift, gains and sufferings on both sides. 
(McCormack, 2013; Hagstrom, 2010) The difficulty, in McCormack’s words, is 
compounded by the process of gradual, but fundamental, shift in the power balance 
that prevailed throughout the 20
th
 century. Therefore, when the possible new shift in 
relative weight is happening, “islands that in themselves are trivial come to carry 
heavy symbolic weight” again. (McCormack, 2013) Scholars also emphasized that, 
with both China and Japan involved in a number of other territorial disputes in this 
region, neither wants a negative precedent to be set that would change the tone for 
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further resolutions of similar disputes; therefore, each actor in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute must be very careful of the consequences of their actions that will be echoed 
throughout the region. (Albrecht & Chemier, 2014) 
 
Against such background, largely due to Japanese domestic politics and the 
judgments/actions of political figures like Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro and 
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Japan decided to purchase and nationalize three of 
the Islands. On April 16
th
, 2012, Ishihara publicly announced his decision to let Tokyo 
Municipality purchase the islands from their private owner. On July 7
th
, the sensitive 
anniversary of the Lugouqiao Incident (or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) which is 
generally regarded as the marker for the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
(1937.7.7-1945.8.15) and World War II in Asia-Pacific areas as well, Japanese Prime 
Minister Noda expressed his consideration for the Japanese central government to 
nationalize the disputed islands. (Zhang, 2012) After this, Chinese angrily protested 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Liu Weimin retorted “No one will ever be 
permitted to buy and sell China’s sacred territory.” (Reuters, July 8, 2012) On August 
15
th
, the anniversary of the surrender of the Empire Japan, activists from Hong Kong 
sailed to and landed on the disputed main island, but later were stopped and detained 
by Japan Coast Guard, although they were deported two days later. (CNN, August 17 
2012) After the detainment of the activists, citizens in mainland China started to call 
for nationwide protests through the Internet and the first wave of demonstrations 
began. (BBC, August 16, 2012) On August 19
th
, a group of Japanese rightists also 
landed on one of the islands, which incurred even greater wrath from both Chinese 
government and society and led to the escalation of protests. (Xinhua, 2012-8-19) On 
September 11, Japanese government formally nationalized three of the Islands held by 
private owner and China sent two patrol ships to the islands to demonstrate its claims 
of ownership. (Mainichi Shimbun, 2012-09-11; BBC, September 11, 2012) Later on, 
fueled by September 18
th
, the 81
st
 anniversary of the Manchuria Incident – the 
National Humiliation in Chinese context, the anti-Japanese demonstrations across 
China reached the peak and took place in over 110 cities. (NHK, 2012-09-18) 
 
Chinese government argues that Japan’s unilateral actions over disputed islands 
in recent years, especially the so-called “nationalization”, seriously challenged 
Chinese sovereignty and also abandoned the “unofficial consensus or understanding 
reached by elder Chinese and Japanese leaders to shelve the dispute” in 1972 and 
1978 when two countries realized the normalization of diplomatic relations and 
concluded the Treaty of Sino-Japanese Friendship, which is viewed in Chinese eyes as 
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“not only terribly damaging Sino-Japanese relations but also reversing the outcome of 
World War II – the denial of the victories of world anti-fascist war and the 
resurrection of Japanese militarism”. (Drifte, 2013; Xinhua, 2012-09-25) Although 
this and the “understanding to shelve dispute” are still subjects of their quarrels and 
refuted by Japan, the aftermaths of these incidents last and Sino-Japanese relations, 
even more aggravated by their increasing engagements of air and naval forces in the 
region, remain frozen.  
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Slogans in the Demonstrations 
2.1. Methodology 
Due to the time and scale of the events, slogans and banners of the 
demonstrations need to be collected through visual materials like pictures and videos 
during that period. In the sense of this research, slogans, actually as a kind of or at 
least parts of those visual protest materials after picking up only textual information 
and excluding others, are used as the empirical data for getting access to some parts of 
modern Chinese nationalistic discourse in this specific case and probably on the social 
movement level. Although textual slogans are the direct research objects, to deal with 
pictures and videos is anyhow the first step to get them, which is why feasible 
approaches of doing similar researches need to be referred to and introduced.  
Axel Philipps gave a research sample of visual protest material to demonstrate 
how applied visual methods can increase the outcome of protest or social movement 
research and that his study highlighted how visual analytical procedures could provide 
extra information for supporting or rejecting interpretations. (Philipps, 2012) In his 
study, he argued that protest events need to be set in context, which means protests 
cannot be talked about without the whole picture they fit into – the debates leading to 
such protests and the social, political and cultural environment, the time point when 
and where all these events occurred. So in my case study of slogans in 2012 
anti-Japanese demonstrations, the context involving such demonstrations has in the 
first place been introduced in former sections of this paper to provide a larger picture 
for readers to link to. On the other hand, he highlighted visual protest material 
recording the demonstrations in contrast to traditional surveys, which means the 
material itself is an inseparable part of the protests and “independent from the 
subjective perception of a single researcher because the protesters are the creators of 
such material”. Philipps also recommended a series of strategies for reducing observer 
bias, one of which is the accumulation of visual protest material and building an 
archive of such material to therefore make it open to different interpretations by 
different researchers, and thus, one is able to analyze such visual protest material as 
realizations of the protesters’ disposition and orientation. (Phillips, 2012) With such 
approaches, in the preparation stage of my case, as many photos and videos as 
possible have been gathered through Internet in order to cover demonstrations and 
people in different places during that period and the collection of extracted textual 
slogans has been completely provided as the appendix for possible use of different 
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researchers.  
In the process of collection, some methods of visual interpretation mentioned in 
Philipps’ paper have been used. This includes the first impression analysis introduced 
by Müller-Doohm (1997) in order to systematize heterogeneous visual material. He 
provided a guided interpretation procedure as “a combination of textual and visual 
analysis” and focused on the inner relationship and formal composition of an image to 
ensure that written texts are in accordance with other information within the frame. 
However, since unwritten information beyond the textual slogans is not designed 
objects to study in this paper, the parts concerning textual information in the first 
impression analysis are mainly used. By means of such method, the samples of 
slogans have been dealt with according to: (a) primary messages; (b) represented 
objects and individuals; (c) employed style elements; (d) and the type of production. 
The purpose of the first impression analysis is to identify prototypes of different 
visual materials that share specific characteristics. (Philipps, 2012) With primary 
messages and represented objects and individuals in head, some elements sharing 
similar content or close internal connections seem to be easily caught when to first 
and directly “feel” the slogans. When styles and types are concerned, some interesting 
and specific patterns seem to be used along with different elements in order to lead 
people’s eyeballs towards different issues. Based on this, to make it easy for further 
interpretation and comparison, eight sorts of elements have been summarized and 
marked after each slogan and typical patterns are highlighted in the analytical section.  
The research theme of this paper is nationalistic discourse and empirical 
materials selected are those textual slogans left after the former steps. The discussions 
of slogans mainly adopted the methods of critical discourse analysis. The definition 
of discourse given by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) is “language use in speech and 
writings”. What remains to be discussed in this paper are those slogans in China’s 
2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations as important components of modern Chinese 
nationalistic discourse, that is to say, the language use in these nationalistic 
demonstrations. In Fairclough’s opinion, discourse, as the constituting parts of society 
and culture, is an ideological tool and a kind of social practice, which makes a 
perpetual intervening force in social order and reflects the reality from various angles. 
It manipulates and influences the social processes by the means of reproducing and 
recreating the ideologies. With the help of critical discourse analysis, one can 
reproduce some of the composer’s identities and concerns, power relations and 
connections with historical backgrounds. (Fairclough, 1992)  
More specifically, the main approaches of critical discourse analysis include 
linguistic, intertextual and historical context analyses, all of which have been involved 
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in this paper. For linguistic analysis, according to systematic functional linguistics, the 
transitive system is the cornerstone of describing reality in people’s language, in 
which what people think, do, hear and see are described into different processes and 
indicated by various kinds of participants and environmental components in those 
processes. The same process in reality, verbally, can indeed be narrated by different 
types of process within transitive system, or using the same process however with 
changing positions of participants. Which kind of process to choose and in what way 
to arrange the position of participants, to a great extent, depends on the ideology. 
(Halliday, 1994) Fowler mentioned an example that, if there is a documentary on the 
third world in which the poor people are put as the objects of transitive verbs from the 
beginning to the end, such impression is inevitably to be made onto the audience – the 
poor people are passive sacrifices and victims, rather than the participants of struggle 
and fight. (Fowler, 1991)  
Another thing highlighted in systematic functional linguistics is the interpersonal 
function, which refers to the function of displaying the speaker/composer’s identity, 
status, attitude and intention as well as his/her deduction of what’s going on. It is 
directly related to people’s attitude and opinion, which means a shortcut to dig out the 
ideological effect. (Ji Yuhua, 2001) A simple case is that the use of appellation reflects 
the speaker/composer’s attitude, such as respect, sympathy, contempt, friendliness and 
neutrality, etc. For example, the reference of Mao Zedong in some slogans used the 
title of “Chairman Mao” instead of simply the name and nin, “you” with respect in 
Chinese, instead of ni, general “you”, as the personal pronoun, which apparently 
shows the speaker’s attitude and tendency towards this figure and the political 
thoughts that he put forward and represents. The interpersonal function of the 
language actually suggests a kind of power relations between the speaker/composer 
and other people/parties involved – superior and inferior, dominant and attached, 
leading and following etc.  
In many cases, syntactic structures like the active and passive voices deliver 
quite different textual meanings as well. Ji Yuhua mentioned their research on the 
different front page titles of newspaper reports about Clinton’s White House press 
conference on March 19
th
, 1999, where the case of China suspected of espionage and 
stealing U.S. weapon technologies remained one of the focuses. (Ji Yuhua, 2001) As 
for this question, President Clinton answered: “It is my understanding that the 
investigation has not yet determined for sure that espionage occurred.” The reports 
derived from this sentence later, however, told the story with different attitudes. To 
take two examples in his research, People’s Daily (overseas) used the title “So-called 
‘Stealing Nuclear Technologies’ Unproven” while Singtao Daily reported as 
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“Espionage has no complete answer yet”. Ji Yuhua argued that the word “so-called” 
expressed a negative attitude while “unproven” – the passive voice, attempted to show 
the objectiveness; the title of Singtao Daily adopted the active voice, in which 
“espionage” was put at the beginning as emphasis while “has no answer yet” seemed 
to express the connotation that “there would be complete answer and truth”. The 
active voice seemingly left a more direct impression to make people feel the possible 
“crafty and conspiracy behind the scenes” when the author assumed that most of their 
readers had already been quite familiar with the case (or former reports). The active 
and passive sentences here led to different connotations and hence readers’ 
understandings.  
For intertextual analysis, it highlights the author’s rhetorical intentions of 
producing such texts and the readers’ understanding about such rhetorical intentions 
when they read such texts. (Dai Weihua, 2000) In Fairclough’s opinion, linguistic 
analysis focuses on how the author selectively utilizes the language system while 
intertextual analysis focuses on how the author selectively utilizes discourse order and 
textual styles. Different styles and forms of text contain different potential meanings, 
represent the interest and ideology of different people or groups. Intertextual analysis 
is conducive to reveal the way of combination and the degree of being harmonious of 
different textual materials and styles, in order to further explore their semantic and 
syntactical functions. (Fairclough, 1992, 1995) One good example fit for intertextual 
analysis among the slogans is an “although/even though” pattern (哪怕……也要……, 
literally means even though …, [I/we] will/should/have to…), in which different and 
even irrelevant textual materials are mixed and put in contrast within one similar 
structure. Generally speaking, both in English and in Chinese, the action and 
condition are in accordance with each other in such adverbial clause of concession. 
However, in most of those samples adopting such pattern, for some reasons and 
purposes, facts put after “even though” (哪怕……) have little to do with the claims 
followed (也要……). They appear to be arranged deliberately in this way to produce 
some kind of hidden texts and dramatic effect. Based on the above theories, there 
must be some potential meaning in this specific pattern and arrangement which 
represents the interest and ideology of some people or groups. The intertextual 
analysis will help to discuss this issue and some other similar slogans in details to 
reveal their secrets in the following sections of this paper. 
For historical context analysis, Foucault emphasized the historicity of discourse, 
whose idea influenced scholars like Utz Maas who thinks that discourse is a language 
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form closely connected with social practice and only to link the discourse with the 
history of social practice makes discourse analysis meaningful and possible. Siegfried 
Jager also thinks that discourse is institutionalized and formulated language form 
relating to action and power relation; any discourse has its historical origins by which 
today is influenced and tomorrow determined. (Fariclough & Wodak, 1997, P266-267) 
In his research, Wodak along with other historians tried to analyze the anti-Semitic 
tendencies in Austrian society after the World War II by means of historical context 
analysis and he pointed out that many authors and speakers were quite willing to use 
anecdotes of the past to allude to the present since this was the best strategy to get 
away with accusations – because they didn’t directly yell out “Down with the Jews” 
after all in the eyes of the law. (Wodak, 1989) For cases like this, historical context 
analysis is useful and powerful for linking specific phrases with the historical 
background and unraveling the mysteries hidden among the words and between the 
lines. Language used as slogans in the anti-Japanese protests also takes their roots in 
Chinese history, culture and society. Some “shrewd” composers tried to pack their 
ideas, which may cross the line of government tolerance or indeed not convenient to 
be made public or put in a “too straightforward” way for whatever reasons, into 
slogans with comparatively less “showy” expressions that can be easily unscrambled 
and eventually play their “intended” role – to transmit the ideas they want to say. The 
specific word may appear simple and “harmless” but the unspoken message and 
symbolic value behind it can turn out to be complicated and unexpected. “The 
historical context of word itself could be the context of an ideology.” (Ji Yuhua, 2001) 
Then to explore the origins and changing processes in people’s impression of such 
expressions would definitely help to reveal users’ understandings and intentions. 
Another point to stress is that historical context analysis is one of the tools and 
inseparable parts of critical discourse analysis, which means it cannot be done alone 
without supporting each other. 
In former sections, some main points of the historical background of 2012 
protests and Chinese nationalist context have been introduced to provide a basic 
ground for readers to build their understanding when reading the analytic content of 
slogans later, but it is impossible to give mature consideration to and cover all 
relevant aspects of the question in this short paper. Corresponding examples and 
details will be given when specific samples are met and dealt with. In this paper, 
slogans in Chinese would be translated and explained in the way as close to its 
original Chinese way of expression as possible in order to more completely and 
accurately preserve and reveal their wording, function, style and connotation, etc. like 
above. This paper aims to offer readers inspiration and discussion about modern 
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Chinese nationalist discourse on the mass movement level with the methods of critical 
discourse analysis like above, to the slogans selected from the case of 2012 
anti-Japanese demonstrations. 
2.2. Collection and Arrangement 
Through plenty of visual materials during August and September in 2012, more 
than three hundred samples of slogans and banners have been collected and about 200 
left excluding highly repetitive and defective samples. (See Appendix) Slogans in the 
demonstrations, no matter in Chinese or in English, with strong pertinence and 
purposes just as the demonstration itself, are composed in order to advertise certain 
ideas, build certain atmosphere and eventually attempt to affect or change certain 
situations. The characteristics of language use in slogans and the composers’ concerns 
with occasion, audience and effect, etc. require relatively concise words, clearer 
claims, objects that people are more familiar with and more impressive styles and 
forms. Thus, slogans tend to use symbolized people, events and objects to represent 
larger things like nation or ideology, and combine different elements and signs for 
more dramatic effect, which make slogans appear more fragmented both in structure 
and meaning. 
To make it more convenient for interpretation and intertextual analysis beyond 
each sample, eight sorts of elements, those of every sort more similar or relevant to 
each other, have been summarized from the content of those slogans and marked with 
their numbers after each one involving them. Those eight sorts of elements are: 
 
1. Directly aiming at Diaoyu Islands dispute or problem of territory and 
sovereignty. Emphasis put on defending national sovereignty and maintaining the 
territorial integrity, which involves the key issue of this round’s Sino-Japanese crisis – 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute, and other relevant issues such as East China Sea and South 
China Sea, etc. as well.  
2. Relating to history memories (ex. national humiliation, historical guilt of 
Japanese imperialism), emphasizing patriotism and wish for a more powerful nation. 
Symbolized cognition of Japan and understanding/expectation about “Chinese” in 
contrast, i.e. a symbolized Japan (ex. 日本鬼子 ribenguizi - “Japanese Devils”, 小日
本 xiaoriben – “little Japan”, Yasukuni Shrine, US-Japanese Alliance, cartoon, etc.) 
and an imagined China (ex. Great Walls, one billion youths, 泱泱大国 
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yangyangdaguo – which means “a great and proud country” , etc.) 
3. Any kinds of retaliatory actions and counter measures including both specific 
behavior (like calling for boycotting Japanese products, attacking Japan and its 
leaders, declaring wars, etc.) and imagined retaliative means (like curse that disasters 
happen in Japan). 
4. Concerning personal life and benefits, widely-concerned social problems and 
livelihood issues. It could be lots of specific problems which have nothing to do with 
islands dispute or Japan (ex. commodity prices, food safety, pollution and pension 
issue, etc.) or elements of Japan relating to people’s private interest and preferences 
(ex. cartoons, adult videos, cheap and good-quality Canon cameras, etc.) 
5. Involving the image, role and action of the government and authorities, both 
existing images that people hold (ex. weak, corrupted, Chengguan – “city inspectors”, 
etc.) and roles that people expect (ex. tougher to foreign provocation, etc.). Involving 
domestic politics, ideological claims and their corresponding representative 
figures/symbols (ex. the use of Mao Zedong’s name and thoughts according to the 
composer’s understanding, the ideas about political figure like Bo Xilai and his 
political practices, and the advocation and claims of universal values like democracy, 
liberty, human rights, rule of law, etc.). 
6. Opposing violence, emphasizing “rational patriotism”. Criticizing violence of 
any kind during the demonstrations and some people’s behavior contradicting to the 
empty talks that they shouted as “loving the country”; calling for peaceful and rational 
expression of personal concerns and opinions, which is consistent with the idea of 
mainstream media. 
7. Reflecting such identities as region, stratum and profession. In some slogans 
appear the descriptions and emphasis on the shared identities like grassroots, home 
cities, people of the same occupation, etc.  
8. Other 
 
By the means of first impression analysis, all samples in the appendix have been 
labeled with the serial number of elements involving. According to the number of the 
sort of elements each slogan carries, they could be divided into two types – unitary 
type, mainly carrying one sort of elements, and compound type, carrying two and 
more sorts of elements. 
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2.3. Interpretation and Comparison 
Some of both types have been chosen to discuss in this paper. Based on the 
approaches of critical discourse analysis, steps taken to process these slogans are 
designed mainly in order to answer the following questions: in what styles and forms 
has the slogan been composed; what objects and opinions have possibly been 
emphasized in each slogan, and what might be the primary concerns and claims; the 
phrasing can possibly tell what kind of identity, status, attitude and intention of the 
composer, that is to say, the interpersonal function and power relations of/in the 
discourse; who might be the audience that the composer expects or target that he or 
she tries to project ideas onto; how have those different kinds of elements been linked 
together within the compound type of slogans, and what could be the hidden words 
and historical context behind it, etc. 
 
Slogans carrying the first sort of elements generally express the claims of Diaoyu 
Islands and/or the wish and resolve to defend national sovereignty, dignity and 
territorial integrity. However, different moods and ways of expression, adding 
different elements lead to nuances and even opposite effect in the connotations. 
In “Diaoyu Islands are China’s inherent territory” (钓鱼岛是中国的固有领土) 
and “Diaoyu Islands are our country’s divine territory” (钓鱼岛是我国的神圣领土), 
“Diaoyu Islands” as both subjects, first and foremost, are stressed. Both slogans adopt 
simple declarative sentences and both in the meaning declare the fact that Diaoyu 
Islands belong to China. Different attributes, however, contribute to the nuances 
between two sentences. The former one is literally in accord with Chinese 
government’s official statement (Xinhua, 2012-09-25), in which the possessive 
“China’s” makes it available to say by both Chinese and anyone else, sound like 
judgment with “relatively neutral stance” or “bystander’s eyes” and seemingly 
without personal emotions; the latter one picks the expression “our country’s” in the 
contrast, apparently stressing the point of view of the composer as a Chinese and 
revealing strong emotional preferences as the sense of belonging, responsibility and 
pride. The following “divine territory” further more displays such kind of “honorable 
sense of mission” when “divine” implies absolutely inviolable and superior stance. 
The expression “divine/sacred territory” was also once used in official situations such 
as the spokesman of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs who stressed “No one will 
ever be permitted to buy and sell China's sacred territory”. (Reuters, July 8 2012) By 
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comparison, “inherent territory” as the predicative seems to seek legitimacy from a 
historical perspective and more sounds like rational explanation based on historical 
facts that could be introduced to anyone. Although both slogans actually expressed 
support for Chinese official stance – historically based claim (Drifte, 2013), and 
reassert whom Diaoyu Islands belong to, the former one would be more likely used as 
diplomatic parlance in the official statement and negotiation on an equal basis, while 
the latter one shows much stronger personal feelings whose targets are probably Japan 
or anyone that holds an opposite point of view. In slogans like “Diaoyu Islands are 
Chinese territory, Japan get out!” (钓鱼岛是中国领土，日本滚出去！), this target 
appears more specific and clear. 
Compared to declarative sentences, slogans, due to the situations where they are 
used, are more likely to be designed in imperative mood and couplet style to make it 
sound much stronger. Such sentences like “Defend Diaoyu Islands! Expel Japanese!” 
(保卫钓鱼岛，赶走日本人！), “Send troops to the islands!” (驻军钓鱼岛！) actually 
stress the initiative that China/our side should have in contrast to the “opposing” ones 
which still focus on Japan, demand/expect Japanese to stop or change its actions. 
Moreover, since most of the actions expressed in such ones probably cannot be 
performed by individuals or ordinary people, these slogans likely take Chinese 
government and national authorities as their designed audience if the composers don’t 
simply attempt to warn or threaten Japan by their voices. People using these slogans 
try to discuss or provide suggestions of specific actions/postures for the government, 
to push and urge it to do so to show toughness. In this sense, their demonstrations here 
aim at influencing how their own government behaves, or we might say, express more 
concern about the image of the government left on them, although Japan in this case 
could be a good target to test whether the government is able to meet people’s 
expectations, like “enough toughness to foreign provocation”.  
The impressions or expectations of the government/national authorities implied 
in the slogans are not limited to their performance in diplomacy or international 
relations. “How do we take back out territory Diaoyu Islands? Well, send the 
Chengguan (city inspectors) and China’s corrupted officials there.” (要怎么收回国家
领土——钓鱼岛？哎，不如叫城管和中国的贪官去吧). “Our armed police and 
Chengguan troops, don’t lord it over (the people) at home, go to Japan!” (我们的武警
战士城管队伍莫要在家逞威风，去日本吧！) Slogans like these two are quite 
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interesting since the composers somehow ridicule some national authorities like 
“Chengguan”, Chinese armed police and corrupted officials, who are known/thought 
by the composers as usually tend to act mighty towards ordinary people and throw 
their weight around at home. The connotation is “now that you are so powerful and 
bossy, why not go to show your strength towards Japanese and take back our 
territory”. Among all those departments, Chengguan – Chinese city/urban 
management officers mainly in charge of street vendors, unlawful business and the 
appearance of urban areas, have been of ill reputation on media and to ordinary 
citizens for their terrible or even violent ways of law enforcements in several 
malignant cases. “Chengguan” even became a new loanword in English, synonym for 
violence, bully and terrorize. (Ramzy & Lin, 2009) The composers link these images 
with the islands dispute, or more specifically, China’s reaction towards Japan over the 
dispute, which imply, on the one hand, the composers’ discontent and sarcasm with 
those authorities, domestic affairs and the administrations’ attitude/style in dealing 
with citizens; on the other hand, somewhat disappointment in government’s reaction 
over the dispute – expectations of stronger and more effective counter measures to 
defend the territory. 
 
Quite a few slogans call upon people to boycott Japanese goods as a counter 
measure against Japan’s actions over the islands dispute, which is an often used tool 
of Chinese nationalists to demonstrate their anger and initiative, aiming at ordinary 
people or consumers. Composers of this sort design their slogans and claims based on 
the understanding about economic ties between China and Japan, more specifically 
Japan’s economic dependence on China/Chinese market, which from their perspective, 
is usually one-sided and oversimplified but “indispensable to Japan”. “Chinese don’t 
buy Japanese products, Japan will collapse (by itself) without being attacked” (中国
人不购日本货，日本不攻自破) and “Boycott Japanese goods, stop supplying 
rare-earth metals!” (抵制日货，停供稀土) are both based on this kind of judgment 
and confidence.  
China is world’s largest rare-earth producer with a proportion of over 90% of 
global total output. Rare-earth metals are indispensable resources to Japanese 
economy, especially its electronic and high technology industries, and hence Japan 
was once the largest consumer of China’s rare-earth export. In September 2010, due 
to the Sino-Japanese conflict caused by the ships’ collision incident in surrounding 
waters of Diaoyu Islands, Chinese government restricted the export of rare earth to 
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Japan as one of official economic sanctions, which forced Japan to make some 
concession but actually led to serious economic losses of both sides and greater 
dispute. (BBC, March 27 2014) Apparently, the composer of the second slogan 
attempts to urge the government to take similar sanctions again. The term “Japanese 
goods” implies the differentiation made by both composers that in the market 
according to their imagination, there are simply two types of goods – Japanese ones 
and non-Japanese ones. In this sense, the connotation of this term is actually closer to 
Japanese brands, or even just famous Japanese brands known by the composer, rather 
than Japanese goods. As for not well-known Japanese products, Japan-made parts in 
other non-Japanese products, or brands with a name or feature similar to Japanese 
pronunciation and style mistaken as Japanese but actually not from Japan, etc., these 
situations are probably not of the composers’ interest and concern. The claim to 
boycott Japanese goods or impose economic sanctions like “stop supplying rare-earth 
metals” are both driven by a judgment or motive that this action could lead to losses 
of Japanese companies and hence do harm to Japanese economy, which will further 
cause pressure on the Japanese government to influence its decisions. This does make 
sense and is easy to understand since China’s boom and Japan’s increasing trade 
dependence on China are known by one and all. However, there are two facts 
generally ignored in their claim. Firstly, economic ties are not unilateral but mutual, 
i.e. China does not enjoy a one-sided overwhelming advantage. Indeed, Japan’s 
dependence on China appears greater than the other way around, (Wang, 2010) which 
gives many people, including the composers, great or even starry-eyed confidence. 
But the neglect/ignorance of the complexity of real situation quite likely leads to the 
exaggeration of such dependence and China’s economic power, underestimation of 
possible risks, over simple judgments and blind actions which may result in great 
losses for China itself, as shown in the case of rare-earth export limit in 2010. (BBC, 
Oct. 26 2013) Secondly, in an age of globalization, there are almost no simple 
“Japanese goods”, i.e. to beat Japan without hurting China since they so deeply 
interrelate. (Gao & Zhao, 2012) It is quite possible that the composers try to find more 
effective and influential ways to demonstrate their claims and anger against Japan 
beyond simple protests when well-known “Japanese products/brands” in daily life 
appear easy objects to use – to make/show people a near and tangible target rather 
than something thousand miles away. After all, what Japanese do over disputed 
islands and how Chinese government reacts are hardly determined by ordinary people, 
but whether to consume certain brands and products seemingly always lie in the hands 
of consumers – “we are powerful enough here to say ‘no’.”  
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“Diaoyu Islands belong to China since 1372!” – one shares some similarities 
with the expression “inherent territory”, however, what attention needs to be paid to is 
that this slogan is written in English – in the protests occurring inside China and 
dominated by Chinese. Language has its own social and cultural background. 
Although English is the most important international language today, neither China 
nor Japan use English as important language at home, while more familiar and typical 
English-speaking countries for ordinary Chinese might be United States, Britain and 
some other western countries. This slogan apparently tries to project its information to 
someone beyond China and Japan, especially when taking into account the various 
and subtle positions of those parties. It could be United States, Australia, some 
International media and someone that does not know the truth or history facts which 
the composer thinks of, or someone in favor of Japan’s side for whatever reasons. 
Among all possible targets, the United States, believed by many in actually interfering 
in this Sino-Japanese dispute, ranks high due to its vague while tricky position and 
alliance with Japan. The US officials stressed that “the United States holds no position 
and would not take sides over the Islands Dispute” and “hope that concerned states 
resolve this issue through peaceful means”, yet at the same time “the islands 
administered by Japan are covered by US-Japan Security Treaty”. (Fenghuang, 
2012-07-10, 2012-08-16) Through TV programs, newspapers and Internet, the US 
government’s attitude was widely reported and hence well-known by Chinese people. 
A slogan in English to stress China’s sovereignty and long history of control could 
possibly aim at such ambiguous positions of some countries. “Since 1372” in the 
slogan underlines the long history and hence the legitimacy of China owning Diaoyu 
Islands, whose connotation is “first come first served” – Diaoyu Islands belong to 
China since long before and hence still belong to China now as a matter of course. If 
we say that the composer takes advantage of some hidden qualities of language in this 
slogan to imply his/her judgment that “some people beyond China and Japan don’t 
think Diaoyu Islands belong to China and even interfere in this dispute, so I should 
wake them up and reassert the truth”, then in the following slogan similar judgment 
aims at more specific target, however tells something else. 
 
“Enforce justice for/on behalf of Heaven, evil United States and Japan, if (you) 
dare to harm the security and interest of our nation, US president and his people as 
well as Japanese prime minister and his people shall all suffer disasters.” (替天行道，
邪恶的美国与日本，如敢损害我国安全与利益，美国总统与人民及日本首相同人
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民全家遭殃) This is indeed an interesting example of Chinese-way of thinking. “Evil 
United States and Japan” as the clear attacking targets reveals the composer’s own 
opinion – United States and Japan are birds of the same feather, they act evilly in 
collusion and come to harm our national interests – we or China on Good side; 
“United States and Japan” rather than “Japan (the one that directly robbed our islands) 
and United States” also implies some subtle power relations in the composer’s 
opinion that it is United States that is Japan’s big boss and backstage backer, and the 
“real main threat” to our country. However, apart from reflecting the popular 
judgment that the US sides with Japan, the cultural meaning of this slogan is far richer. 
“替天行道” – titianxingdao, in the very beginning, refers to “to perform righteous 
deeds, enforce justice for/on behalf of Heaven”, usually used together with punishing 
villains described by “天理不容” – tianliburong (not tolerated or forgiven by 
Heaven/Heavenly Principles) in order to stress the necessity and validity to wipe out 
such evil, the legitimacy to comply with “天道”(the Way of Heaven), “天理” 
(Heavenly Doctrines). This typical Chinese-way saying is based on traditional “侠义
观” – Chinese Errantry Culture, which basically means strong sense of justice and 
ready to help the weak, and “天命观” - the Mandate of Heaven, which refers to an 
ancient Chinese belief and philosophical idea that Heaven ( 天  Tian) 
bestowed/granted a dynasty or emperors the right or legitimacy to rule based on their 
ability to govern well and fairly. If the emperor, as the Son of Heaven, fails the 
mandate (e.g. despotic or misconduct), Heaven will let disasters happen as warning or 
eventually withdraw the mandate leading to the overthrow of that ruler or end of an 
dynasty – under this belief, Heaven approve of revolution and overthrow of unjust 
rulers. (Zhao, 2012; Jiang, 2011) This saying provides an overwhelming imposing 
manner in the slogan while also reveals the so-called “天下认同” – Tianxia Rentong, 
(self-identity with the people/children living on the Land under Heaven) an exclusive 
notion of Chinese civilization later spreading across East Asia (Gao, 2004; Wikipedia 
- Tianxia); and “中央帝国” – Central Empire Complex (China at the middle of the 
land under heaven) of many Chinese people under the influence of traditional world 
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views and cultural values. In this context, the unspoken message is that China’s 
security and interests comply with “the Way/Mandate of Heaven”, to defend China’s 
sovereignty is to practice “Heavenly Doctrines” while on the contrary, United States 
and Japan who challenge such security and interests are those villains who defy “the 
Way of Heaven” and justice. The curse in the latter part comes naturally and 
coherently with such way of thinking – “US president and his people” and “Japanese 
prime minister and his people” is such a pattern as “top leader and his people” in 
which a dependence/subordinate/possession relation is thought to exist, a clear brand 
of thoughts from thousand-year imperial age that “普天之下莫非王土，率土之滨莫
非王臣” (from 诗经. Classic of Poetry) – “No land under the heaven is not the king’s 
territory; no one in charge of those land is not the subordinate of the king”. What is 
intended to express by that curse is that “if/because president and prime minister 
make such decisions that lead US and Japan against “the Way/Mandate of Heaven” 
(harm China’s national interests), Heaven then will release disasters to make their 
family and their people suffer (exactly what “遭殃” means). This reflects important 
content of traditional Chinese context like “天命观” (view of the Mandate of Heaven), 
“天人合一” (Chinese Encyclopedia, 1983) – “Heaven and people unite as one 
integral that their deeds can affect each other”, “天子的君权神授” (divine right of the 
emperor as the “son of Heaven”), etc., the common ideas of those refer to that the top 
leader (emperors and their dynasty) can only rule when they have such “天命” – the 
mandate of Heaven, if he does something wrong and evil, retributions will constantly 
befall as warning and punishment until he loses the mandate. Apparently, the 
composer of this slogan hasn’t jumped out of the fetters of traditional “Dynasty 
Identity” and the ideas of the Mandate of Heaven, all of which coexist with ideas of 
modern nation state, sovereignty and other identities. This also indicates that quite 
possibly not a small part of modern Chinese nationalism takes its roots in traditional 
culture and historical context – materials to mix and build the identity “Chinese”, 
which greatly influence or even determine how people think and react. 
 
“Opposing Japan invading and occupying Chinese territory Diaoyu Islands” (反
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对日本侵占中国领土钓鱼岛) and “Opposing Japan’s ‘nationalization’ of Diaoyu 
Islands” (反对日本钓鱼岛“国有化”) lay particular emphasis on opposition and 
discontent towards what has happened or is happening, whose target is Japan and the 
actions performed by Japanese government on Diaoyu Islands. These slogans do 
clearly show that those actions taken by Japanese government, especially the 
“nationalization” through the year of 2012, directly stirred the oppositional sentiments 
in Chinese society and resulted in these people’s demonstrations against Japan. The 
“invading and occupying” used here somehow implies that in the composer’s 
understanding the situation today could be quite easily linked to the past in people’s 
mind when Imperial Japan invaded and occupied China. Nevertheless, “(I or we) 
opposing” implies an “I” or more likely a whole “we” who hold one common position, 
have one powerful voice and the “solidarity” of such a whole; but “opposing” implies 
relatively passive reaction and weaker/disadvantaged position because the time and 
situation to demonstrate opposition seemingly means the lack of effective measures 
and ability to change the status quo, which exposes a kind of understanding about 
power relations, i.e. the composer has his/her own judgment of the islands dispute 
situation when creating such slogan, consciously or unconsciously.  
In Ching’s research (2012), he examined somehow similar power relations 
between China and Japan, through the epithets like ‘riben guizi’ or Japanese devils, 
‘xiao riben’ or little Japan, which were used quite frequently in the 2012 protests 
slogans as well, not limiting to a case like this but in a longer span of history. He 
analyzed the instance of ‘riben guizi’ in Chinese popular culture in four historical 
moments: late-Sinocentric imperium, high imperialism, socialist nationalism and 
post-socialist globalization. In his words, he tried to show that “while this ‘hate word’ 
performs an affective politics of recognition stemming from an ineluctable trauma of 
imperialist violence, it ultimately fails in establishing a politics of reconciliation”. 
Anti-Japan epithets like ‘xiao riben’ – little Japan, “attempt at overturning the 
subordinated position of the Chinese vis-à-vis the Japanese”, which was caused by the 
rise of Japan and fall of China in modern history, “at least symbolically”. He argued 
that “anti-Japanism in China is less about Japan than China’s own self-image 
mediated through its asymmetrical power relations with Japan throughout its modern 
history.” (Ching, 2012) 
In the slogans “Compatriots, wake up and rebel against little Japan’s oppression!” 
(同胞觉醒起来， 反抗小日本压迫), “Great and proud China, no fear of little Japan” 
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(泱泱大中华，何惧小日本!) , “little Japan, obsessed with ambitions, dare bully big 
China” (小日本，野心勃，敢欺大中国), etc., these entangled feelings or ambivalent 
understandings as Ching suggested could be sensed. “Japan is little but 
oppressing/bullying us.” Then the question would be what they think of China, large 
but weak and subordinate? – “compatriots remain asleep and should be awakened” 
“China is great and proud” – seemingly a series of contradictions, unyielding while 
fragile emotions exist within. Even though it is 2012 - almost 70 years after World 
War II, and China has overtaken Japan as the second largest economy, in an islands 
dispute far from China’s mainland with Japan, people still hold or easily recall such 
ideas – severe trauma of the past continues, memories and old ways of thinking still 
linger. At least for the composers of these slogans, the cognition of the relative weight 
of China and Japan has not been updated along with China’s recent years’ 
development. In the first sample, s/he first put an emphasis on Chinese people 
themselves – “sleeping compatriots” in his/her understanding for some reasons, which 
further prove Ching’s argument that expressions like this and anti-Japanese focuses 
revealed from them are more about China’s self-image – what “Chinese” was/is and is 
supposed to be like, in these people’s mind. 
 
As we have introduced in former chapters, Chinese nationalism largely roots in 
the history, especially the modern history and the memories about Japanese invasion; 
a common feature of nationalist views about Sino-Japanese relations or 
Japan/Japanese itself is to mix “Japan in history” with “Japan today”, or I would 
argue, more possibly the failure to distinguish one from the other. China’s claim of 
Diaoyu Islands is also historically based; Chinese official vigilance towards Japanese 
domestic political trends and actions in history problems, islands dispute, etc. is also 
delivered as “the revival of Japanese militarism and the challenge to the outcome of 
world anti-fascist war” (Xinhua, 2012-09-25). Whether the official rhetoric and 
posture are naturally engendered response or deliberately schemed, it is indeed in 
accordance with the history-oriented way of thinking, which has so popular, 
remarkable influence on not a small number of online nationalists and offline 
demonstrators as well as the slogans they created. This could be obviously seen in 
slogans like “Japan, guilty person of WWII, has no shame/bold as brass (to occupy 
our land)” (日本，二战罪人，厚颜无耻。); “the pain of Nanking (Nanking Massacre), 
never forget” (南京之痛，永世难忘); “Commemorate 9.18 (September 18 Incident or 
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the Manchuria Incident), recover/take back Diaoyu Islands” (纪念九一八，光复钓鱼
岛); “New hatred and old rancor, ‘bloodwash’ Japan” (新仇旧恨，血洗日本)； “For 
400 years, killed our parents, defiled our wives and daughters, looted our wealth, 
those like ambitious wolves with savage hearts, (we will) absolutely revenge/put to 
death even though (you are) distant” (400 年来，杀我父母，污我妻女，掠我财富。
狼子野心者，虽远必诛。), etc. The weight of history is too heavy to bear and this 
appears especially true for China who has a long history both of itself and of its 
association with Japan. The disputes with Japan today are so naturally and generally 
put together/linked with people’s historical memories about Japan’s past and specific 
events. History remains dominant factor and perhaps the obstacles as well in their 
understanding and judgment about Sino-Japanese relations and the future. Despite 
understandable and necessary causes, anything too much, however, would squeeze the 
space for others so that it might blind people to see the rest. Just as an ancient Chinese 
saying “a leaf before the eye shuts the sight of a whole mountain”, if the leaf of the 
past – grief, grudge and hence revenge, stays too close and clinging, it is possible to 
lose a lot more of the present and the future. The demonstrators may not need to mind 
but the decision-makers of a state have to balance, which is surely not limited to 
Chinese side only.  
     
The slogans above mainly aim at targets outside China (like Japan or foreigners) 
or the group of people which the composers both they think belong to and 
subconsciously define (perhaps all Chinese with shared historical memories, ordinary 
citizens in contrast to the government or people demonstrating here to alert other 
fellow citizens). However large or small the range is, their arguments are designed to 
demonstrate a “united whole” or to call on people to unite, mainly or more directly 
accentuating solidarity, inclusiveness and ‘positive’ efforts to ‘close ranks’ against 
enemy regardless of possible differences (like not tough enough government and 
‘compatriots asleep’). But there are also ones attempting to reach agreement while 
using different ways of speech, which I would call ‘negative’ ways like threaten, 
suppress or stigmatize. Although they seemingly try to unite some people by setting 
standards to exclude the others, they in fact emphasize the differences and fail to 
build/maintain an inclusive unity. In slogans like “Anyone that says Diaoyu Islands 
belong to Japan is traitor (to China)” (谁说钓鱼岛是日本的就是汉奸), “Punish 
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traitors/quislings inside and fight for sovereignty outside” (内惩汉奸/国贼，外争国权
/主权), efforts to patch up differences and to reach a consensus are replaced by 
measures to eliminate differences/treason and exclude the different. Then the question 
would be what define “traitor” and who the “traitor” is. The division line in the first 
slogan is quite simple and the audience set here is apparently those within the Chinese, 
because “汉奸” or Hanjian, a typical derogatory and pejorative Chinese term, literally 
means those betray their own race but specifically the traitor to Han people (not any 
race or country, gradually expanded to Chinese nation later) and collaborator with 
other enemy ethnicity (or foreign nations). This word has quite some history but it 
became so popular and notorious mainly due to a large number of Chinese 
collaborators during Japanese invasion. (Wang, 2009) However, we can find that this 
term is so generally and frequently used or even abused today among Chinese 
nationalists and in many online forums, since many of them rashly throw this word, 
usually as a bad label with absolute denial and severe criticism, to anyone who has a 
different idea with them in any topics somewhat relating to national interest or even 
general political issues. The composers of both slogans above used this term probably 
based on the assumption or imagination that there isn’t, however there should be, a 
united opinion among Chinese in the islands dispute with Japan, and definitely the 
composers themselves insist that Diaoyu Islands belong to China, that is to say, they 
think “the truth and justice lie and only lie in their hands”. But beyond themselves or 
people holding the same opinion as them, there are different arguments within 
Chinese claiming that the dispute remains unclear or Diaoyu islands belong to Japan, 
etc., and as long as others have different claims, or merely “say” something different 
from their belief, are traitors to China. Moreover, the connotation is evident that such 
different voices are immoral, traitorous and not supposed to be tolerated and accepted, 
or should be punished. Their logic is so crude and simple while so common in their 
way of thinking/speech that people dominated by such logic are called and satirized as 
“simple patriots”, and in contrast those often receiving such “label-putting service” 
mock themselves as “non-simple patriots”. (Yahoo Historical, 2013; Sina, 2013) 
Wang Ke (2009) argues that the term Hanjian and its abuse reflect an imagined 
unitary nationalist or patriotic discourse which does not ever exist, and exactly 
because this doesn’t even exist within the nationalists who take for granted that they 
share the same ideas and discourse, it explains why serious internal dissensions often 
happen within the group, and the members frequently throw this term to each other as 
well. A possible tendency in this logic is that patriotism or unconditionally loving 
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your country prevails over everything else, and shown in the case with Japan, usually 
to over-simply object to everything relating to Japan/Japanese – to love the country is 
unconditionally right, hence anything opposite is definitely wrong; we stand on the 
right hill or hold “truth”, so we can do anything as long as we think it runs counter to 
this belief/doctrine; even if we damage property, beat someone or violate the law, 
patriotism justifies our actions.  
In this case, the composer of the first slogan apparently assumes that in a 
territorial dispute like Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, anyone as one of Chinese should/ has 
to, as a matter of course, keep unanimous in preserving the interest of “our 
side/race/nation” despite any excuses – to maintain collective interest or at least 
verbally support it and show your determination, “patriotic heart” are superior to 
personal interest, independent thinking or judgment about the facts, freedom of 
speech and thought, etc; in this opinion, sovereignty is more important/valued than 
human rights, i.e. individuals can/should not, or at least are not encouraged to 
question and challenge your own country’s interest and stance for any reasons, and 
show off your unique and independent points of view in the face of national gains and 
losses. Slogans with similar expression, tone and logic could be found more in 
China’s old revolutionary ages when various radical campaigns or political practices 
were launched by CCP, millions of innocents were suppressed and those with 
different political opinions were terribly persecuted, dissident voices were silenced by 
political labels like “rightist”, “capitalist authority”, “reactionary”, “traitor”, etc. For 
example, during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, there were 
slogans like “Anyone saying People’s Communes are not good is class enemy” (谁说
人民公社不好就是阶级敌人), “Proletarian Cultural Revolution is great” (无产阶级
文化大革命就是好), “Any decisions made by Chairman Mao should be firmly 
maintained, any instructions given by Chairman Mao should be persistently obeyed” 
(凡是毛主席作出的决策，我们都坚决维护，凡是毛主席的指示，我们都始终不
渝地遵循), etc. (People, 2001-06-27)  
This kind of relevance and resemblance in discourse is quite likely to make 
people curious about the possible deep connections in ideology between some 
elements of contemporary Chinese nationalism and “leftist or ultra-left” political 
thoughts in modern China. And not surprisingly, it doesn’t come alone in the 
anti-Japanese demonstrations. Apart from the slightly sensible similarity in a slogan 
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designed to “reassert sovereignty”, there are ones more obviously disguising political 
claims along with other topics into one slogan at the same time, or even directly 
contending political views, which in fact have little to do with islands dispute, 
sovereignty and anti-Japan, without camouflage. Importantly, the political opinions 
involved are not merely limited to leftist claims as well.  
 
One example is “Little Japan, get out! Secretary Bo (one of Bo Xilai’s official 
positions), come back! Strongly resist GM food (genetically modified food)! Punish 
severely traitors and quislings!” (小日本滚出去，薄书记快回来！坚决抵制转基因，
严惩汉奸卖国贼!) This slogan is indeed rich in content since it includes four distinct 
arguments at the same time. Although it has a symmetrical style, there isn’t much 
coherence among different claims. Except the first and the last short sentence which 
are similar to what have been discussed above, there are two different concerns here 
that the composer tries to demonstrate. It has been introduced in the background 
chapter that, Bo Xilai, the highly controversial, conceited governor of Chongqing with 
high position and Princeling birth, had been dismissed in March, 2012 due to the 
impact of a series of incidents like the betrayal of a crucial subordinate, his wife 
involved in murdering a British man, etc. (BBC, Nov. 11 2013) Due to his radical 
political practices in Chongqing, advocation of Maoist thoughts and campaigns of 
“sing red songs and striking the black (gangsters)”, he was known both at home and 
abroad, and regarded by new and old leftists and conservative forces as the 
beacon-like politician of leftism and Maoism as well as a powerful candidate for 
Member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Some of his policies like infrastructure 
construction and increasing wage level in Chongqing also helped him win the “trust 
and respect” of some ordinary people. His downfall was out of question a hard blow 
to those in favor of him. “Secretary Bo”, similar to “Chairman Mao”, instead of 
calling directly by name, reveals the emotions of fondness and respect. The composer 
obviously tries to express his support/favor to Secretary Bo Xilai and grievances 
about his dismission, which most likely aim at the central government and politicians 
opposing Bo Xilai as well as his deeds.  
As for the part “resist genetically modified food”, it turns to a social issue – the 
public doubts about the safety and reliability of genetically modified food (GM Food) 
in Chinese society, which remains a controversial topic, accepted/supported by some 
and rejected by others. (Tencent, 2013 – controversy over GM food rises again) Even 
though many scientists and government officials repeatedly explained and insisted on 
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its safety and benefits, not a small number of people remain very doubtful about it and 
the official credibility since serious food safety problems and the government’s 
dereliction of duty still happen sometimes in recent years, leading to popular distrust 
and caution. This part of the slogan reveals such doubt and concern of the composer 
over this issue. 
These two parts of the slogan are designed to discuss/demonstrate concerns 
about domestic political or social issues rather than islands dispute, although they are 
put between claims dealing with the dispute, which appear more like the smoke bomb 
and cover up the true intentions/key points. The reasons why the composer do so - 
like playing edge ball, to mix relatively sensitive issue with more general topics or 
politically “more” correct ones such as the islands dispute, may to some extent imply 
his/her worry and hence adopting ways to lower risk since domestic politics, 
especially involving high level factional struggles, largely remain taboo in public. 
 
However, there are quite many slogans evidently/directly focusing on political 
opinions without using camouflage of islands dispute or anti-Japanism, that is to say, 
more “audacious and confident”. In slogans like “Secretary Bo, people’s good 
secretary” (薄书记，人民的好书记), “Chairman Mao, people miss you so much” (毛
主席，人民好想你), “Great Chairman Mao, we need you, we call you (‘you’ with 
respect in Chinese)” (伟大的毛主席，我们需要您，我们呼唤您), “Only Mao Zedong 
Thought can save China” (只有毛泽东思想才能救中国), “Hold high the great 
banner of Mao Zedong Thought and advance courageously” (高举毛泽东思想伟大
旗帜奋勇前进), etc., the judgment and appraisal of representative figures like Bo 
Xilai and Mao Zedong as well as the political thoughts dominate the whole content. 
Composers of these slogans use more straightforward and plain way of speech to 
demonstrate their political opinions and support to certain leaders or ideology. The 
appraisal of Bo Xilai as “people’s good secretary” made a direct challenge to the 
official announcement which harshly criticized Bo and his rule in Chongqing. 
(Fenghuang, 2012-09-29) The use of “people” and “we” imply the composers’ 
assumption that their opinions are representing more Chinese people or the masses 
and therefore the government should listen to people’s voices and do what “we” claim. 
The highlight of Mao Zedong and his political thoughts – “great” “hold high” “only it 
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can save China”, reveal the political/emotional tendency of the composers who 
greatly value Maoism and cherish the memory of Mao’s era, Mao’s rule and Mao 
himself, while quite possibly, deny/dissatisfied with China’s other leaders, current 
road of development and social conditions which basically happened under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his political thoughts of Reform and Open after 
Mao’s period. (Hu, 2007) “Only Mao Zedong Thought” indicates their “strong while 
exclusive” belief and that they reject any other political ideas; “save China” quite 
likely shows their disappointment and grievances, or even despair with China’s status 
quo. Whether it is living conditions, economic development, wealth distribution, 
foreign policies or some other aspects, they think Bo Xilai’s Chongqing Model or 
China in Mao Zedong’s age, meaning “justice, equality, security, toughness, etc.” 
according to their understanding, could better match their expectations and bring 
better lives, therefore, they appreciate Bo and Mao, claim to change and return to that 
kind of guiding thoughts on behalf of “the interest of all Chinese”. 
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, some other distinct political claims in sharp 
contrast to the leftists exist in the demonstrations, although such slogans apparently 
try to play edge ball as well with the cloak of islands dispute. In both “Want 
democracy, want freedom, defend Diaoyu Islands!” (要民主，要自由，保卫钓鱼岛) 
and “Turn anger into strength, want political reform, want freedom!” (化愤怒为力量，
要政改，要自由！), sentence except respective “two wants” serves more as a foil or 
camouflage to the real purposes. The target of both slogans is most likely to be 
Chinese government and party leaders, although “turn anger into strength” in the 
second one make it sound like suggestion or call for everyone who feels angry in the 
islands dispute or for other possible reasons, to guide them towards more important 
issues that the composer think we should be concerned and use our strength to solve. 
The main claims in both slogans directly deal with the politically most sensitive topics 
in China – universal values and political reform, and hence are extremely rare to be 
observed in public occasions after 1989 Tiananmen Incident, since this kind of 
demands, usually seen as “liberalist or rightist” in Chinese context compared to the 
leftism, make more serious challenge and greater pressure to the Party authority and 
government than Maoist claims. (Zhao, 2013) Apparently, the composers focus and 
put more emphasis on China’s internal problems instead of dealing with external 
conflicts like Japan. With this tendency, they try to divert people’s attention back to 
internal affairs, which sometimes exactly contradicts to what the government intends 
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to do. Another sample from the slogans is simply made up of several separated words 
- “Freedom, Democracy, Human Rights, Constitutionalism, Defend Diaoyu Islands” 
(自由 民主 人权 宪政 保钓). Similar to the above one, claim directly relevant with 
the original causes of the demonstrations – Diaoyu Islands, is attached after the main 
points of modern politics, which are obviously what the composer mainly attempts to 
present, more like “by the way” to make the whole slogan appear less abrupt with the 
whole demonstrations. If values like freedom, democracy, human rights and 
constitutionalism are main concerns, it implies the composer’s assumption that China 
lacks those necessary elements and should do more to improve/get closer to these 
goals.  
Composers with similar political tendencies and internal-oriented focuses are 
more inclined to create/use complex type of slogans in which many issues could be 
demonstrated at the same time while some relevance among different materials could 
be drawn as well. See the following one: 
“Not have health care, not have social security, but we should have Diaoyu 
Islands in our hearts. Even though the government doesn’t provide pensions, (we) 
should/have to take back Diaoyu Islands. Without property rights, without human 
rights, (we) fight for sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands. Cannot afford a house, cannot 
afford a tomb, (we) will not yield an inch of ground to Japanese.”  
(没医保，没社保，心中要有钓鱼岛；就算政府不养老，也要收复钓鱼岛。
没物权，没人权，钓鱼岛上争主权；买不起房修不起坟，寸土不让日本人。) 
This long and complex slogan includes various materials involving different 
issues at one time, and goes in two pairs of couplet sentences in Chinese (easily 
pronounce and remember). To view its content, the composer seems to put stress on 
the latter part of each sentence – the claim about cherishing, taking back Diaoyu 
Islands and not yielding to Japanese, etc., due to the grammatical order. However, the 
problems and conditions described before those are what really catch viewers’ 
attention and raise their wonder at the first glance. Issues mentioned as the lack of 
social security and medical care, inadequate and untrustworthy pension system, 
deficiencies in preserving property and human rights, skyrocketing housing prices and 
expensive tombs, etc. are livelihood issues that have long been the focuses of people’s 
concern in Chinese society. “Cannot afford housing prices, cannot afford medical 
costs, cannot afford education expenses” are teased by the public as “the new three 
big mountains” compared to old ones in Chinese history (imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucratic-capitalism). (Wu, 2013; Shi, Hanbing) The composer adopts a somewhat 
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sophisticated way of speech to express his/her support for China’s claim over Diaoyu 
Islands, however, the addition of reporting extra materials, which somehow sounds 
like complaints, makes the claim and whole slogan appear a bit ironic. In this slogan, 
the apparent discontent with livelihood conditions is dramatically linked together with 
islands dispute and nationalist claim. The focus and description on internal social 
problems and livelihood difficulties, most likely to affect lower class people and 
invulnerable groups, turn out to be what the composer truly attempts to discuss and 
demonstrate, towards both the government and other people. There can be a different 
interpretation about this slogan as well – that people try to show their fortitude and 
solidarity in a national conflict with Japan despite so many hardships. It is partly true 
but I would argue that, in this sense, it is exactly what they try to play down that 
reversely exposes the serious problems and stratum division, that is to say, not 
monolithic or united. Anyway, such different characteristics and focuses altogether 
make slogans similar to this one appear less nationalist than populist.  
 
There is another sample actually focusing on more private appeals of smaller 
groups, which make it appear more like being used in a strike instead of nationalist 
demonstrations. “Strongly protest that Japanese bosses punish and fire workers at will! 
Raise wages and improve working conditions!” (日本老板乱惩人乱炒人强烈抗议！
提高工资，改善待遇！ ) The only relevant point here with the anti-Japanese 
demonstrations is “Japanese bosses”. The claims in this slogan are very clear – to 
oppose bosses’ management and ask for better treatment. However, the “shrewd” 
composer very likely tries to take advantage of the timing when the whole society was 
under the shake of nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations, to help/make the claims 
appear stronger and use the social ambience to cause more pressure on the Japanese 
boss. In this sense, the specific issues and concerns in work are viewed along with 
large aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, which are used to raise the stakes and 
success rate of negotiation. When we look back to these slogans, we could see a lot of 
calculating and weighing work behind these simple texts. 
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Conclusion 
Slogans, as an important form of discourse, are reflections of the composers’ 
judgments, intentions, concerns and opinions about a wide range of issues from 
international politics to social hot spots. More than eight sorts of elements and content 
are involved in the slogans collected from the demonstrations; however, they are 
surely not all of it. With the help of critical discourse analysis, more hidden 
information can be unlocked from them than they appear to be. The slogans 
mentioned/analyzed above more serve as the introduction to what people said and 
why they said so in the case of 2012 protests, more importantly, help us to better 
understand Chinese nationalism, Sino-Japanese relations or China itself. 
 
Just as argued in this article, nationalism or patriotism is generally viewed as a 
flag or tool in China that could be used to justify or cover up many acts bound with it, 
which explains why so many slogans, with various distinct opinions and concerns, 
emerged at the same time and places in the same demonstrations. We can definitely 
say that the anti-Japanese demonstrations triggered by the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute are nationalist protests since they are closely connected with Chinese 
nationalism, with the situation of China itself and its perplexing relations with Japan. 
It is also not wrong to say that the discourse used by those participants and in these 
processes are nationalist discourse. Nevertheless, just as Chinese nationalism is the 
outcome of various complex issues, the nationalist discourse in such demonstrations is 
numerous and jumbled as well.  
 
Through former discussions, three basic conclusions can be reached in this thesis. 
Firstly, quite a few slogans indicate that Chinese nationalism and the discourse among 
nationalists are greatly tied up with history and memories, whether nationalism itself 
or Chinese claim and understanding about the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. 
Secondly, the demonstration itself provides a chance and platform for all kinds of 
arguments and ideas to be made public, various social sentiments to be released, 
which are hardly possible in normal times due to Chinese government’s strict “Wei 
Wen” – preserving stability policy. These ideas and concerns are not limited to the 
islands dispute, anti-Japanism or even nationalism but originate widely from different 
aspects of Chinese society and development. The inherent nature of nationalism – an 
ideology dealing with people and their identity, makes it available for both the origin 
of legitimacy for the government and an effective means for ordinary people to 
express/justify their claims. Thirdly, nationalism or patriotism in China is a large flag 
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under which people seemingly originally gather, or be gathered, to demonstrate their 
solidarity and uniformity, however, eventually ironically exposed their serious 
division and divergence. The diversity of concerns and opinions in the slogans on the 
other hand reveals many realistic problems and the fragmentation of people 
participating in those demonstrations, quite possibly an epitome of Chinese society. 
Led and covered by this large flag, people with different political views, social status, 
intentions, concerns and backgrounds join and mix into the demonstrations in the 
name of defending sovereignty and opposing a foreign nation. It seems that they are 
all moving forward on the road in one direction for similar goals, but the answer 
would probably be no.  
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Appendix 
 
Serial Number & Main Points of Elements 
1. Diaoyu Islands; territory, sovereignty and national interests 
2. History memories, patriotism; symbolized understanding of Japan 
3. Counter measures and retaliation 
4. Personal life, social problems and livelihood issues 
5. Image of authorities; domestic politics, ideologies and representative figures 
6. Opposing violence, rationality 
7. Identities relating to home cities, stratum or the same occupation 
8. Other 
 
钓鱼岛是中国的固有领土   1 
钓鱼岛是我国的神圣领土   1 
Diaoyu Islands belong to China since 1372!   1 
人人保卫钓鱼岛   1 
维护主权，寸土不让   1 
保卫河山，寸土不让   1 
钓鱼岛是中国领土，日本滚出去   1 
保卫钓鱼岛，赶走日本人！   1 
还我河山，还我保钓人士！   1 
谁说钓鱼岛是日本的就是汉奸   1 
中国很生气，后果很严重   1 
中国的领土不容侵犯，中国主权不容挑衅   1 
反对日本侵占中国领土钓鱼岛   1 
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反对日本钓鱼岛“国有化”   1 
头可断，血可流，钓鱼岛不能丢！   1 
反日大游行，小日本滚出中国   1、2 
保我中华，还我钓岛，抗击鬼子，有我一份   1、2 
对日宣战，我捐一万，保卫钓鱼岛，我是中国人   1、2 
替天行道，邪恶的美国与日本，如敢损害我国安全与利益，美国总统与人民及日
本首相同人民全家遭殃   1、2 
保钓抗日寇，寸土不能丢   1、2 
保卫钓鱼岛，打倒法西斯   1、2 
纪念九一八，光复钓鱼岛   1、2 
誓死捍卫祖国领土完整，让爱国主义旗帜高高飘扬   1、2 
中国钓鱼岛，中国必胜，中华人民共和国万岁！   1、2 
中国国大，无一寸领土多余   1、2 
美日勾结侵占钓鱼岛无耻！   1、2 
为钓鱼岛而战，如国家需要宁做战死第一人。   1、2 
祖宗基业誓死必保，收复钓鱼岛武力解决   1、2、3 
中华儿女，团结抗日，对日宣战，抵制日货，保钓光荣！   1、2、3 
永不忘九一八！钓鱼岛是中国的！我们爱好和平，但从不惧怕战争！只做爱，不
做战！   1、2、4 
日本购岛出兵无凭无据无理，政客媚外勾美可悲可耻可恨   1、2、5 
还我自由，还我国土。   1、2/5 
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钓鱼岛是我们中国的，本商场拒绝日货   1、3 
灭日之灾，由今开始。炮轰东京，捍我钓岛   1、3 
哪怕……也要……    1、3、4 
哪怕华夏遍地坟，也要杀光日本人。宁肯大陆不长草，也要收复钓鱼岛。 
哪怕天天被代表，也要收复钓鱼岛。哪怕顿顿瘦肉精，也要出兵灭东京。哪
怕喝遍地沟油，也要挥刀斩倭寇。 
宁愿我们吃不饱，也要收复钓鱼岛。哪怕养老没人管，也要占领富士山。 
 
捍卫主权，不辱使命，抵制日货，表我决心。   1、3、5 
钓鱼岛是中国的，苍井空是世界的！   1、4 
内忧转基因，外患钓鱼岛   1、4 
没医保，没社保，心中要有钓鱼岛；就算政府不养老，也要收复钓鱼岛。没物权，
没人权，钓鱼岛上争主权；买不起房修不起坟，寸土不让日本人。   1、4、5 
小日本滚出去，薄书记快回来！坚决抵制转基因，严惩汉奸卖国贼！  1、4、5 
维护领土主权，不做缩头乌龟，政府担起责任，保卫南海，保卫钓鱼岛   1、5 
驻军钓鱼岛   1、5 
拿出行动，拒绝谴责   1、5 
要怎么收回国家领土——钓鱼岛？哎，不如叫城管和中国的贪官去吧   1、5 
给我三千城管兵，一定收回钓鱼岛；给我五百贪腐官，保证吃垮小日本。 1、5 
派出一队城管，日本立马完蛋   1、5 
我们的武警战士城管队伍莫要在家逞威风，去日本吧！   1、5 
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我本谦让，怎奈鬼子猖狂。烦我国土，气焰甚是嚣张。   1、5 
钓鱼岛是中国的，薄熙来是人民的   1、5 
要民主，要自由，保卫钓鱼岛   1、5 
自由 民主 人权 宪政 保钓   1、5 
化愤怒为力量，要政改，要自由！   1、5 
百万市民网上请愿——阻止日本侵犯钓鱼岛   1、5 
内惩国贼，外争主权。/内惩汉奸，外争国权。   1、5 
湘军保钓   1、7 
日照人民声援保钓   1、7 
常德越战老兵支持为国捐躯   1、7 
你 MLGB 的小鬼子在俺们这噶哒舞舞扎扎的，瘪犊子脑瓜子给你削碎乎喽！钓
鱼岛到是中国的。   1、8 
消灭倭寇   2 
世界警惕日本军国主义，死灰复燃，世界灾难   2 
维护世界正义，警惕军国主义   2 
日寇必须下跪谢罪   2 
十亿青年十亿兵，国耻岂待儿孙平   2 
日本，二战罪人，厚颜无耻。   2 
同胞觉醒起来，反抗小日本压迫。   2 
南京之痛，永世难忘。   2 
华夏儿女千千万，何惧倭寇小弹丸   2 
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泱泱大中华，何惧小日本！   2 
小日本，野心勃，敢欺大中国   2 
宁为床前不孝子，勿忘国耻醒世人。   2 
日本军国主义借尸还魂，中华民族众志成城    2 
起来，不愿做奴隶的人们！把我们的血肉铸成我们新的长城！（国歌歌词）   2 
扬我国威，历练斗志，勿忘国耻，振兴中华   2 
靖国神社是猪窝，哦！对不起，不对，是狗窝！   2 
日寇卑鄙，勿忘南京大屠杀，勿忘九一八。   2 
新仇旧恨，血洗日本   2、3 
技术立国，打败日本   2、3 
大刀砍下鬼子们的头颅   2、3 
万里长城十亿兵，越马扬刀入东京。   2、3 
干掉日本，铲除东亚毒瘤   2、3 
东京大屠杀，炸沉日本岛   2、3 
抵制日货，支持国货   2、3 
抗击倭寇，收复琉球   2、3 
向日本宣战，新帐旧账一起算   2、3 
再次炸平广岛长崎   2、3 
心系国事，驱逐日寇   2、3 
核灭日本野狗，铲除民族后患   2、3 
辱我华夏，虽远必诛。/犯我强汉，虽远必诛。   2、3 
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400 年来，杀我父母，污我妻女，掠我财富。狼子野心者，虽远必诛。   2、3 
爱我中华，请求宣战！驱逐日寇，血债血偿！   2、3 
全球华人大集结，坚决、彻底、干净的消灭日本军国主义！   2、3 
十三亿中国人踏平小日本   2、3 
粉碎日本霸权主义卑劣伎俩   2、3 
日本翻案二战胜果，中国亮剑诛杀无赦。   2、3 
反对日本篡改历史教科书！反对日本加入安理会！   2、3 
日本自卫队，你回家自慰去吧   2、3 
日本明仁天皇谢罪！   2、3 
恶狗小泉，疯狗野田，鬼子豺狼，统统杀光，清算历史，血债血偿。   2、3 
华夏儿女，铮铮铁骨。勿忘国耻，以血雪耻。拔刀亮剑，对日宣战。干掉野田，
踏平东京。   2、3 
爱国爱党爱 AV，反日反美反涨价   2、4 
动漫只看喜羊羊，COSPLAY 灰太狼   2、4 
中国是剩女吗？被人奸过 N 次了，穿铁裤衩反抗吧   2、5 
没有义和团中国就没有百年耻辱了吗？推脱什么责任！   2、5 
警惕日本帝国主义，人民子弟兵要给力   2、5 
草根爱国，仗义执言   2、5、7 
唐山人民抗震也抗日，我们 80 后不惧怕战争   2、7 
坚决抵制日货，从我做起！   3 
野田佳彦千刀万剐，天诛地灭   3 
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野田请罪   3 
野田必死，日本必亡   3 
宁可不洗澡，不泡日本汤   3 
向日宣战，踏平东京。   3 
审判战争贩子！野田佳彦，石原慎太郎！   3 
凡进店大吼一声“钓鱼岛是中国的”，打 8.5 折；大吼一声“日本也是中国的”
打 8.0 折。   3 
中日宣战，血洗东京！   3 
亮剑！人不犯我，我不犯人；人若犯我，我必犯人！   3 
中国人不购日本货，日本不攻自破！   3 
一夜踩碎狗奴才，太平洋水漫东京。   3 
抵制日本品牌康师傅、日清、朝日啤酒、索尼、松下。   3 
抵制日货，停供稀土。   3 
中国，闹他！   3 
石原慎太郎，狂妄又疯狂！   3 
以后再买日本货就不是中国人！   3 
东京只要 5 毛钱特价！   3 
每人 10 元，购买日本！   3 
日本对中国的依赖程度现排最前，特别是对中国市场的依赖，如果中国人 1 个月
不买日货，日本将有数千家企业面临破产。如果中国人 6 个月不买日货，日本将
有一半人失业。如果中国人 1 年不买日货，日本经济结构彻底瓦解。考验的就是
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你那颗国心，也许你发布一次，就牵动日本经济一亿元。   3 
强拆日本，向小日本开炮！   3、4 
理性爱国，拒绝打砸，抵制日货，AV 女优除外。   3、4、6 
红动中国，抵制日货！   3、5 
强烈要求中日断交，同禽兽之国交往是和谐社会的最大耻辱。   3、5 
郑州市出租车司机，号召大家抵制日货，大规模经济制裁小日本；坚决支持政府
武力保卫钓鱼岛。   3、5、7 
如果终有一战，请不要为小日本的炮弹买单。（保卫钓鱼岛，文明游行，珍爱市
容）  3、6 
日本老板乱惩人乱炒人强烈抗议！提高工资，改善待遇！   4 
铲除内奸复兴中华，“裸官”下台！   5 
中日断交！   5 
支持海监船暴力执法钓鱼岛！  5 
薄书记，人民的好书记。   5 
东风浩荡气象新，红日东升山河壮。毛主席我们好想您   5 
毛主席，小日本又欺负我们了   5 
毛主席，人民好想你   5 
只有毛泽东思想才能救中国   5 
高举毛泽东思想伟大旗帜奋勇前进   5 
伟大的毛主席，我们需要您，我们呼唤您   5 
毛主席，小鬼子找茬要打大架   5 
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毛爷爷，快回来吧！我们想你！小日本又来了，您的这些晚辈总是抗议谴责，或
是徒劳的，无效的打嘴仗，您说句话他们害怕，我去就是了，还有十三亿中国人
民呢！   5、2 
毛主席，你所感谢的日本帝国主义又回来了！   5、2 
谁不灭日本，谁就去棺材里替换毛泽东！   5、3 
拥护党中央，拒绝打砸抢。   5、6 
生气却不要犯罪，不可含怒到日落，也不可给魔鬼留可趁之机。   5、6 
前方砸车，日系车掉头！   6 
请文明爱国，请理性抗日。   6 
理性爱国，誓不当爱国贼。   6 
战争，地震，水灾，我们都过去了。这不是法西斯，我们的领土不是靠打砸烧。
这不是文革，我们的奥运会全世界都看了。请停止伤害，我记得，我们的祖国充
满爱。   6、5 
爱广州，非暴力！   6、7 
愤怒的鸡蛋免费领取处   8 
FUCK  Japan！小日本我操你祖宗！   8 
